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LABOR MARKETS, HUMAN CAPITAL,
AND DEVELOPMENT PERFORMANCE IN EAST ASIA

Abstract
This paper focuses on the human resources side of development
performance in East Asia since the 1950s, with special attention paid
to Taiwan and South Korea.

Two frames of reference are used to analyze

the successful records of these two systems.

One is to analyze the

relationship between labor markets and human capital formation, the
second the changing interplay between domestic and internationa l
forces.
The initial conditions in each system in the early '50s of course
played an important role.

We then consider the nature of_ the import

substitution phases in both systems, unusually mild, as was the unusual
emphasis on agriculture and the early attention paid to linkages
between agriculture and rural industry even during this inward-orien ted
subphase of development. - Subsequently , as both systems undertook major
policy reforms, _shifting to labor-intens ive industrial export-orien ted
economies in the '60s and early '70s, we again analyze the importance
of labor market conditions along with the rapid mobilization of
agriculture on behalf of a booming industrializa tion effort.

Lastly,

as labor surplus is exhausted, the human capital emphasis in both
systems becomes even more important as they enter the technologica l era
of the '70s and '80s.

Human resource and technology policies with

respect to vocational education, higher education, R&D, etc., are shown
to accommodate, not obstruct, the needs of the systems over time.
Institutiona l and organization al investments, along with flexibility in
macro-econom ic policies, are seen as important contributors to the
well-known success story of East Asia.

LABOR MARKETS, HUMAN CAPITA L,
AND DEVELOPMENT PERFORMANCE IN EAST ASIA
Gustav Ranis*
Yale Univer sity

There are, of course , a number of ways to analyz e the
develop mental succes s of the East Asian econom ies, with specif ic
focus on the relatio nship betwee n labor market s and human
capita l, on the one hand, and both the domest ic and interna tional
perform ance of the econom y, on the other.

We have chosen to

concen trate on the critic al dimens ions of the econom ic record of
these system s over time, with specia l emphas is on the case of
Taiwan , the most succes sful, though we will be making freque nt
referen ce to parall el Korean experie nce.

For each sub-ph ase of

the transi tion we will endeav or to relate perform ance to the role
of govern ment, especi ally as it relates to the labor market and
human capita l dimens ions.
Sectio n I will presen t a brief descri ption of the initia l
condit ions which repres ent an essent ial part of the post
indepen dence story in contem porary East Asia.

Sectio n II will

focus on the decade of the 50s and early 60s, charac terized by
heavy attenti on to agricu lture, especi ally in Taiwan , and a mild
versio n of the import substi tution syndrom e in both countr ies.
Sectio n III will be concern ed with the period betwee n the early
60s and 70s, when both societ ies were engage d in a vigoro us,

* The researc h assista nce of Fritz Foley and Ryan Schnei der is
gratef ully acknow ledged.

largely labor- intens ive export -orient ed develop ment drive.
Finally , Section IV will analyz e the rest of the 70s and 80s,
when these econom ies, moving out of labor surplu s and into labor
scarce situati ons, witnes sed a dramat ic shift in output mix
toward s the higher tech, more capita l and skill intens ive end of
the indust rial spectru m.

Sectio n V will presen t some brief

conclu sions.

I.

Initia l Condit ions.
It should be recogn ized that both Korea and Taiwan already

had unusua lly high literac y rates (about 60%) when the transi tion
curtain rose in the early 50s; second , in Taiwan a coloni al 1905
land reform was reinfor ced by anothe r major land reform in 194953; and a simila rly substa ntial redistr ibutio n of land took place
in Korea under post-w ar U.S. proddi ng.

Both econom ies had been

part of the Japane se coloni al networ k, produc ing what was needed
at home, especi ally agricu ltural produc ts, with 95% of sugar and
52% of Taiwan 's rice produc tion exporte d to the mother countr y.
It should also be noted that the coloni al admin istratio n had
conseq uently expend ed substa ntial resourc es on both rural
physic al infras tructu re, i.e. roads, drainag e, irrigat ion, power,
and on rural institu tional infras tructu re, i.e. agricu ltural
researc h, experim ent station s and farmer s' associ ations .

This

permit ted a substa ntial "green revolu tion" in rice (based on the
ponlai variety ) to occur, raising yields by 4% per year betwee n
1921 and 1937 on Taiwan .

It should be noted that the multip le

croppin g index already stood at the 137 level in the early 1950s
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and that 33% of all household s already had electricit y.
With respect to non-agric ultural activitie s, large-sca le
industry had been kept in the hands of the Japanese, and while
the local populatio n was not admitted into higher education , the
continuing attention to primary education had permitted the local
populatio n to expand its participa tion in small and medium-si zed
industria l and service activitie s.

It should also be noted that

Taiwan's initial human capital fund was substanti ally enhanced by
the early influx of small traders, especially after the
separation from the Mainland in 1949.

At that point, public

sector enterpris es, taken over from the Japanese, included some
very large industria l activitie s, e.g. cement, pulp and paper,
mining, which were soon divested in connectio n with the land
reform program.

The continued gradual process of privatiza tion

in industria l productio n on Taiwan is illustrate d in Table la.
In Korea most of the large-sca le industry was located in the
North, while the South was preponder antly agricultu ral.

We

therefore find less public sector industria l activity there at
the outset and no evidence of a further privatiza tion trend prior
to 1972 (see Table lb).
It should be clear that Taiwan, and to a large extent Korea,
which had received somewhat less infrastru ctural attention during
the colonial period, were inheritors of relatively favorable
initial condition s on the human capital and agricultu ral side.
In both systems substanti al rural activity had been occurring in
the 30s.

Moreover, there were no landed or large-sca le

industria l vested interest groups to be overcome.
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This, plus the

perceived external threat from the Mainland and North Korea,
respectiv ely, gave these newly independe nt autocrati c governmen ts
unusual freedom of action in the economic sphere.
Table la
Relative Importanc e of Private and Public Industria l Production :
Taiwan

I

Years

Source:

I

% Private

I

9.:0

Public

1952-61

48.66

51.34

1962-71

64.24

35.76

1972-81

80.80

19.20

1982-87

83.82

16.18

I

Taiwan Statistic al Data Book 1987, p. 89.

Table lb
Korea

I

Years

Source:

II.

I

9.:0

Private

I

9.:-0

Public

1963

88.4

11.6

1964

87.4

12.6

1971

86.2

13.8

1972

86.l

13.9

L.P. Jones, Public Enterpris e and Economic Developme nt,
KDI, Seoul, 1975.

Interrela tions and Performan ce During the Import
Substitut ion Phase, Approxima tely 1953-63.
This period was character ized by the rapid growth of

agricultu ral productiv ity working in a balanced fashion with
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I

rapid increases in rural non-agric ultural activity, facilitate d
by competiti ve labor markets and accommoda ting governmen t
policies at both the macro and institutio nal levels.

Let me

first examine the performan ce and then link it to features of the
labor market and human capital formation story, as well as other
direct dimension s of governmen t activity.
A dynamic agricultu ral sector is not frequently encounter ed
during the typical initial LDC import substituti on period.

Yet

if there is such a thing as an early "leading sector,'' it clearly
was agricultu re, especially in the case of Taiwan.

In 1952, that

sector generated 33% of the net domestic product, 60% percent of
total employmen t and 90% of Taiwan's still relatively modest
exports.

By 1988 these figures were 6%, 14%, and 6%,

respectiv ely, as we shall see below; but in getting from here to
there, the sector had played a major historica l role not only as
a provider of savings, foreign exchange, and labor, but also in
terms of its contributi on to t?e encouragem ent of dynamic rural
non-agric ultural activity along the way.
Agricultu ral output increased by roughly 4.2% a year during
the 50s on Taiwan (see Table 2), regaining pre-war levels by
1951.

Even more significa nt is the fact that agricultu ral

employmen t rose by 12% during the decade, with man-days deployed
increasin g by 17% and the multiple cropping index rising to 188
by 1964 (and the diversific ation index from 3.5 in 1952 to 5.8 in
1964).

The output of tradition al crops rose by about 50%, but

that of non-tradi tional crops, especiall y cotton, fruit and
vegetable s, approxima tely doubled.
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Non-tradi tional crops were

much more labor intensive statically, and additionally more
subject to technology change of the labor-using variety over
time.

Working days per hectare thus increased from 170 just

after World War II to 260 in the early 60s.
Table 2
Growth Rate of Agricultural output (%)
Years

Taiwan
(annual average)

Korea
(annual average)

1952-60

4.2

2.2

1960-70

4.3

4.9

1970-80

2.6

3.4

1980-89

-0.8

0.7

Sources:

Taiwan Statistical Data Book: Council for Economic
Planning and Development, Republic of China, 1990.
Das, D., Korean Economic Dynamism, Paris, MacMillan,
1990.

It is interesting to note that 45% of the growth of
agriculture during the 50s was attributable to total factor
productivity change, largely a function of government-supported
research and technology diffusion activities, focused in part on
new strains of rice and sugar, but mainly on new crops, cotton,
fruit, vegetables, and, during the 60s (see below), asparagus and
mushrooms.

Agricultural output growth in Korea was much more

modest in the early period, but accelerated later (see Table 2)
as the government belatedly recognized its neglect of the rural
economy and sought to redress it via its "New Community
Movement."
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In reference to the contribution of agriculture, we should
note the gap between agricultural labor productivity change
(changes in the average product of labor) and agricultural wages
(see Figure 1), which permitted substantial agricultural
surpluses to be generated, especially in Taiwan.

While labor

productivity grew by 3.7% a year between 1955 and 1964 on Taiwan,
the growth was more modest in Korea, i.e. 2.4%, during the same
period.

This is partly due to the less favorable initial

conditions there, including climate and soil fertility, partly
also to the less intensive infrastructural investments of the
Japanese period, but also the relatively lower level of attention
initially paid to rural development by the Korean government.
Taiwan's agricultural surpluses went partly into the coffers
of the government via land taxes, a fertilizer-rice barter
program which represented a hidden tax on agriculture, as well as
armed forces procurement at below-market prices.

But an

increasing proportion of the agricultural surplus also found its
way into rural non-agricultural activities via the substantial
household savings occasioned by a combination of fast growth, the
absence of any need to spend privately on education, and an
interest rate reform which took place quite early (in the 50s)
and provided positive incentives.

It is estimated that 15-20% of

total agricultural output was thus transferred in the 50s and
60s, about 10% via the hidden rice tax, 3% in the form of private
savings in the 50s, rising to 12-15% in the 1960s.
Given the equal distribution of land on Taiwan, plus the
shift towards increasingly labor-intensive crop mixes and
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Das, D. Korean Economic Dynamism: Paris; MacMillan, 1990.
The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea:
Cambridge; Council on Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1980.
Major Statistics of the Korean Economy: Economic Planning Board,
Seoul, 1978.
U.N. Food and Statistical Office
U.N. Statistical Yearbook: Various issues, United Nations, NY.
Kuo, S. The Taiwan Economy in Transition: Boulder; Westview Press.
Taiwan Statistical Data Book: Council for Economic Planning and
Development; Republic of China, 1990.
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technologies, the demand for non-agricultural products was
increasingly directed towards the small and medium-scale (S&M)
enterprises located largely in the rural areas, thus
strengthening the mutual linkages between agricultural and non
agricultural productivity change.

This is less true for Korea,

where agriculture was less dynamic and industrialization
substantially more urban-oriented and concentrated.

This early

and continuing relative preponderance of medium and small-scale
firms in Taiwan has been much commented upon.

It clearly

represents a central feature of the landscape, helping to explain
the multi-dimensional success of the system in terms of growth,
employment generation and equity.
The facts are unambiguously clear: in employment terms there
occurred a remarkable shift in the allocation of rural household
labor from agricultural to rural non-agricultural activities over
time, i.e. the latter constituting 29% of the total in 1956, 47%
in 1966, and 67% in 1980.

In income terms, the proportion of

income earned outside of agriculture by rural households rose
from 25% in 1962 to 43% in 1975, and a whopping 60% in 1980.
Taiwan's industrialization pattern thus clearly avoided the
customary relative (sometimes absolute) decline in post-colonial·
rural non-agricultural activities, which indicates that they were
not unfairly competed out of existence by protected urban
industry and services.
An increasingly egalitarian agricultural income
distribution, partly resulting from land reform, partly from the
increasingly labor intensive agricultural output mix (see below,
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Tables 7 and 8), was helpful.

Rural income Ginis, estimated

above .5 in 1950, declined to .31 in 1964, permitting substantial
forward consumption linkages in the direction of domestic S&M and
appropriate goods activities.

This simultaneously encouraged

reverse or backward linkages of the modern inputs variety as well
as via the enhanced willingness of agriculturalists to take risks
in response to new non-agricultural investment opportunities.
The strength of the forward linkages can be demonstrated by
noting that household surveys show that consumers in 1964 spent
approximately 70% of their total on food, beverages, tobacco,
footwear and clothing.

If we match that up with the employment

distribution in Taiwan at that time, we note that the percentages
of those employed in establishments of less than 10 workers
comprised 46% in the food and beverage industry, 64% in clothing,
62% in leather and 90% in furniture, implying strong demand for
the products of small establishments, most of which can be
assumed to be rural.

With respect to the simple version of the

backward linkages story, in the farm machinery industry, for
example, over 40% of Taiwan's production took place in small
firms, very much a function of the fact that agricultural
technology was 80% focussed on small power tillers, again very
unusual by LDC standards in this phase.

It is thus clear that

both the forward and backward linkages were directed towards the
creation of domestic niche markets, in terms of modern inputs as
well as the pattern of consumption.
While Taiwan's agricultural output grew at approximately 4%
on average during the 50s, non-agricultural output increased at
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the rate of about 12% (see Table 3).

Korea's non-agricultural

growth was not very different, but more of it was urban and
financed by a combination of industrial reinvestment and foreign
capital.

Moreover, while exports began to play an increasing

role in both systems, it should be noted that in Taiwan, for
example, 60% of overall growth between the early 50s and mid-60s
was still domestically oriented, a fact which is often overlooked
when the East Asian experience is cited.

During a relatively
-

mild import-substitution phase, the close contact between
agriculture and rural industry and services permitted mutually
reinforcing productivity changes to take place.
Table 3
Growth Rate of Non-Agricultural Output (%)
Years

Taiwan (average)

Korea (average)

1952-60

11.7

9.7

1960-70

18.5

17.6

1970-80

12.9

19.2

1980-89

9.8

6.4

Sources:

Das, D., Korean Economic Dynamism.

Paris, MacMillan,

1990.

Taiwan Statistical Data Book, Council for Economic
Planning and Development, Republic of China, 1990.
Non-agricultural wage rates, tied to agricultural wages, but
at a modest margin, remained relatively stable throughout the 50s
and 60s (see Figure 2), especially if we focus our attention on
unskilled wages (instead of average wages, which distorts the
picture considerably by incorporating marked changes in the skill
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Figure 2a
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Kuo, S. The Taiwan Economy in Transition: Boulder; Westview Press.
Taiwan Statistical Data Book: Council for Economic Planning and
Development; Republic of China, 1990.
Das, D. Korean Economic Dynamism: Paris; MacMillan, 1990.
The Economic and Social Modernization of the Republic of Korea:
Cambridge; Council on Asian Studies, Harvard University Press, 1980.
Major Statistics of the Korean Economy: Economic Planning Board;
Seoul, Korea, 1978.
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mix).

Thus, with labor productivity rising in both agriculture

and non-agriculture, but unskilled wages rising only modestly in
both sectors, substantial margins remained available for both
agricultural and non-agricultural savings and reinvestment.
Nevertheless, mainly due to the effect of employment increases,
the non-agricultural wage bill did not decline, in spite of the
fact that the ample supply of labor kept wages from rising very
much.

Indeed, even during the 50s and early 60s, non

agricultural employment in Taiwan rose by more than 3% per year.
The fact that the relative share of labor remained virtually
constant permitted the overall size distribution of income to
improve, largely because of the improvement in the distribution
of agricultural income, following land reforms, plus the marked
changes in the composition of agricultural output in the
direction of greater labor intensity.

Moreover, even in the 50s

and early 60s, and yet more clearly in the later period, as we
shall see, private savings, generated by households and small
businesses, contributed substantially to the high and rising
national savings rate (see Table 4).

The contrast with Korea's

substantially lower domestic savings rate and consequently
greater reliance on foreign savings is marked.
It should also be noted (see Figure 3) that the gap between
non-agricultural skilled and unskilled real wages was relatively
modest by most LDC, especially Latin American and African,
standards.

There is no evidence of any government intervention,

via minimum wage legislation or otherwise, even during this
period of ISI.

The skilled/unskilled gap seemed to decline in

13

the early 70s, once unskilled labor surplus began to give way to
labor shortage.
Table 4a
Savings Rate and Composition: Taiwan
Year

Gross Domestic
Savings Rate
(S/GNP)

% Contribution

Private Sector

General Gov't

Pub. Enterprise

1952

15.3

50.93

35.58

13.49

1960

17.8

54. 72

22.45

22.83

1965

20.7

69.55

12.64

17.80

1970

25.6

68.03

13. 94

18.02

1980

32.3

60.35

24.49

15.16

1985

32.6

65.61

16.81

17.58

1988
Sources:

64.22
34.9
13.02
22.76
DGBAS; Taiwan Statistical Data Book, Council for
Economic Planning and Development, Rep. of China, 1989.

Table 4b
Korea
Year

Gross Domestic
Savings Rate (S/GNP)

% Contribution
Private Sector
Public Sector

1945

4.63

92.27

7. 73

1960

6.79

63.90

36.10

1965

7.40

76.78

23.22

1970

17.30

62.37

37.63

1975

19.10

78.48

21. 52

1980

21. 90

68.94

31.06

1984

27.40

76.14

23.86

1988
as -'ov, of GDP

30.0 8

n.a.

n.a.

Sources:

Economic Statistics Yearbook, Bank of Korea, Seoul,
1990; National Income Accounts Statistics Yearbook,
United Nations, N.Y. (various years).
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Figure 3a
Taiwan Industrial Wage Gap
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Kuo, S. The Taiwan Economy in Transition: Boulder; Westview Press,
1983.
Taiwan Statistical Data Book: Council for Economic Planning and
Development; Republic of China, 1990.
1988 Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China: Directorate
General of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics; Republic of China.
Major Statistics of the Korean Economy: Economic Planning Board,
Seoul, 1978.
Kim, C. 'Labor Market Development' in Kwon (ed.) Korean Economic
DevelQpment: New York; Greenwood, 1990.
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Government policies during East Asia's relatively mild
import substitution phase not only moved the systems towards
higher real interest rates, breaking the back of inflation with
the help of foreign aid inflows -- especially from the United
States -- but also began to gradually open these economies to
foreign investment and to replace quantitative controls by
tariffs.

As early as 1956, a customs duty rebate system for

exports was instituted on Taiwan, followed by foreign exchange
reforms, i.e. a major devaluation followed by unification and
maintenance of a relatively realistic exchange rate regime after
1960.

The four large government enterprises -- cement, paper,

forestry and mining -- were transferred to private ownership by
1954 as part of the compensation to landlords under the land
reform program, with the policy of assigning to the private
sector the principal role in industrial development affirmed as
early as 1962.

By the early 60s, the so-called 19 points of

macro-economic reform had substantially liberalized Taiwan's
economy, facilitating entry into the next, export-oriented phase
of development.

A similar package of macro-economic reforms was

introduced in Korea, if generally a few years later.
Referring once again to direct actions by government, it
should be noted that Taiwan and, once again to a lesser extent,
Korea continued to build on the favorable rural infrastructure
left by the Japanese colonial period.

This is demonstrated by

the fact that Taiwan's rural road network was further extended
(it was 2 1/2 times as dense as that of the Philippines by 1976)
and substantially paved (twice as much as that of the
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Philippines).

We may also note that access to electricity,

especially in the rural areas, which is critical for
decentralized industrial growth, climbed rapidly, as did
communications and the provision of simple amenities.

This is

well illustrated in Table 5.
Table 5
Infrastructure: Taiwan

% Households

% Households

with
Electricity

with
Telephones

% Households
with
Piped Water

1952

33

2

14.4

1979

99.7

71.1

63.8

Source:

Statistical Abstracts of Transport and Communication.

The differential post-independence treatment of the
institutional structure left behind by the Japanese in the rural
areas of our two East Asian cases is both important and
instructive.

In Taiwan, the JCRR (Joint Commission on Rural

Reconstruction) was reorganized to provide for a "bottoms up"
relationship with the farmers' associations, while the same
association·s were used for "top down" instruction and taxation in
Korea.

This is one of the reasons we believe there resulted not

only the referenced differential performance of agriculture in
the two cases, but also a very differential pattern of non
agricultural growth.
In Taiwan, most farmers' associations were focussed on
agricultural production, some specifically concerned with
irrigation, others with fishing.

In addition to providing all-
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important research and extension, the JCRR featured assistance
with purchasing, marketing, warehousing, and processing.

By 1964

the multiple cropping index stood at 188 and the diversification
index had almost doubled.

While the JCRR at the center provided

overhead funding and services, priorities were set by the
farmers' associations at three levels: provincial, county and
township.

Farmers' associations organized cooperative banks,

with farmers depositing their own savings and receiving loans for
production and marketing.

The JCRR provided information and

technical assistance as well with respect to rural non
agricultural activities, especially food processing.
Agricultural processing, including for export, constituted the
fastest growing non-agricultural activity by the end of this sub
phase.
Korea, starting with a lower initial base, relatively
neglected its agricultural sector during the 50s and early 60s
both in the resources and institutional sense.

It later,

however, began to recognize its mistake and to attempt to repair
the damage in the 70s via institutional reforms (New Community
Movement) as well as increased research attention (see Figure A
for comparative trends in the two countries).

As a consequence

total factor productivity in agriculture grew at 4.7% annually in
the 70-77 period, compared to 1.4% between 1954 and 1965. 1
1

The differential agricultural output growth figures over
time were presented above (in Table 2). The relative contri
bution of total factor productivity in Taiwan was 49% between
1957 and 1967 and 18% between 1973 and 1977. In Korea, on the
other hand, the relative contribution of total factor producti
vity was 36% in 1954-65 and 86% in 1970-77.
(Agricultural
Development in Chian, Japan and Korea, Hou Chi-Ming and Tzung
Shin Yu, editors, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C.)
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Figure A
Agricultural Research Expenditure
(% of Agricultural Output)
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The absence of official intervention in East Asian labor
markets, so frequently encountered elsewhere, either through
minimum wage legislation or government-sponsored unionization,
may be seen as an important contributor to the development
process -- even during this relatively interventionist import
substitution period.

What is sometimes referred to as

"repressed" labor markets really constituted an unwillingness by
government to create an elite organized labor force at the
expense of foregone employment opportunities as long as
substantial underemployment existed.

The fact that wage bills

held steady or increased, while wage rates continued to reflect
the underlying endowment during the 50s as well as the 60s,
contributed to -- rather than hurt -- the relative position of
East Asia's working families.
As far as human capital formation is concerned, the emphasis
in both countries during this period continued to be mainly on
improving literacy via the pursuit of compulsory universal
primary education, as Table 6 indicates.

Total enrollment rates

rose especially fast between 1953 and 1965, faster for women than
for men.

It is worthy of note, however, that Taiwan clearly had

a substantial advantage early and held it over time.
In summary, given East Asia's relatively mild import
substitution phase, agriculture behaved unusually well,
especially in Taiwan.

More remarkable was the very active

balanced rural growth process already in evidence, given the
still somewhat distorted overall macroeconomic setting prior to
the major liberalization package adopted in the early 60s.
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In making these policy changes, Taiwan was undoubtedly
assisted, in the political economy sense, by the 1961
announcement that the U.S. intended to terminate its foreign aid
program by 1965.

Thus, a combination of an intrinsic natural

resource poverty and the announcement of the end of economic aid
by its major foreign donor undoubtedly helped focus the minds of
Taiwan's policy-makers and induced the economy to shift
relatively smoothly towards the export-oriented phase beginning
in the early 60s.
In Korea, this macro policy shift took place a little later.
The aftermath of the Korean War and the continued confrontation
between the South and North, plus the fact that the U.S. economic
presence, including U.S. troops, remained a feature of the
landscape, probably reduced the pressure on the Koreans to
undertake similarly thorough-going reforms.

Certainly it led to

a greater relative willingness early on to neglect agriculture
and the rural sector generally and to instead concentrate more on
bestowing favors on partly foreign-financed large-scale urban
industry.

However, certainly by comparative LDC standards, both

these East Asian systems were eminently successful in making this
politically difficult transition; both had clearly moved into a
vigorous labor-intensive industrial export phase by the mid-60s,
a subject to which we now turn.
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Table 6a
Population by Levels of Education
(At and over the Age of Six)
Taiwan
End
of
Year

~
0

of Population

Higher
Education

Secondary
Education

Primary
Education

Others

Illiterate

1952

1.4

8.8

43.5

4.2

42.1

1960

1.9

12.4

54.1

4.5

27.1

1966

2.5

15.8

54.8

3.8

23.1

1970

3.7

26.5

51.8

3.3

14.7

1974

4.8

29.1

49.9

2.9

13.3

1980

7.1

36.9

43.3

2.4

10.3

1988

10.1

44.2

37.0

1.3

7.4

Source:

MOI.

Table 6b
Population bv Levels of Education
(At and Over the-Age of Six)
Korea
End
of
Year

~
0

of Population

Higher
Education

Secondary
Education

Primary
Education

Illiterate

1944

0.3

1.7

11.3

86.7

1960

2.6

17.5

36.2

43.7

1966

4.5

24.7

40.0

30.8

1970

5.6

31.8

39.2

23.4

1974

5.7

38.0

36.0

20.3

Source:

McGinn et al., Education and Development in Korea,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
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III. Interrelations and Performance During the Labor-Intensive
Export Substitution Phase, Approximately 1963-72.
The decade of the 60s was a period of the most rapid overall
growth in East Asia, particularly Taiwan.

Agricultural output

increased at an average rate of 4.3% (see Table 2), and labor
productivity rose even faster, with the total agricultural labor
force beginning to decline absolutely after 1965.

Most of the

agricultural output increase came through increased yields at the
intensive margin, as a consequence of a new burst in agricultural
research and the shift to such new crops as mushrooms and
asparagus, already referred to.

The resulting dramatic changes

in the composition of agricultural output as well as in its
accompanying labor intensity are illustrated in Tables 7 and 8.
Table 7
Agricultural Output Composition(%): Taiwan
Rice

Other Traditional
Crops

Non-Traditional
Crops

1960

57.0

15.8

27.3

1970

45.0

12.9

37.1

1980

41. 8

7.4

51. 0

1988

27.1

7.9

65.0

Source:

Y.K. Mao and c. Schive, "Agricultural and Industrial
Development of the Republic of China," processed (Table
2. 6) •

Table 8
Agricultural Labor Utilization (Days/Ha): Taiwan
Rice
1970
ISource:

other Traditional
Crops

206
I
I
Taiwan Agricultural

131
Council.

23

Mushrooms

I

270

Asparagus

I

730

I

Meanwhile non-agricultural output boomed in both countries
(see Table 3) and the rate of increase of non-agricultural
employment doubled.

The role of agricultural savings in helping

to finance this rapid expansion of non-agricultural output
remained important, especially in the early years of the decade.
It is estimated that on the average 15-20% of Taiwan's
agricultural output was transferred as agricultural surplus to
non-agriculture during this period.

Agriculture thus continued

to be a major asset to the growth of the economy.

But by 1972

its contribution to GNP had fallen from 36% in 1952 to 14%, and
its contribution to employment from 56% in 1952 to 33%.
Manufacturing had increased from 11% in 1952 to 32% in terms of
output, and from 12% to 25% in terms of employment.
This was clearly the decade when industrialization, now
increasingly export-oriented, concentrating first in
agriculturally processed goods and later in labor-intensive
commodities based on imported raw materials, began to soar.

The

1960s indeed embody the best example of a mutually reinforcing
relationship between the two blades of Taiwan's development:
domestic balanced growth, on the one hand, and labor intensive
industrial exports, on the other.

Figure 4 shows the rapid

growth in the overall export orientation of both systems at a
time when GDP itself was rising at 8% per year.

Table 9 provides

evidence of the dramatic change in the composition of these
rapidly growing exports, from about 90% agricultural to 85% non
agricultural in the course of a mere decade.
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Figure 4a
Taiwan Export Orientation
(% of GNP)
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Taiwan Statistical Data Book: Council for Economic Planning and
Development; Republic of China, 1990.

Source:

Figure 4b
Korea Export Orientation
(% of GNP)
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Major Statistics of the Korean Economy: Economic Planning Board;
Seoul, Korea, 1978.
Monthly Statistics of Korea: National Bureau of Statistics; Economic
Planning Board, 1979.
U.N. Statistical Yearbook, various issues,, United Nations.
Statistical Yearbook of Foreign Trade: Office of Customs
Administration, Republic of Korea, 1980.
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Table 9a
Composition of Exports in Taiwan
Year

Agricultural and Processed
Agricultural Products

Industrial Products

1952

91.9

8.1

1960

67.7

32.3

1965

54.0

46.0

1970

21.4

78.6

1975

16.4

83.6

1980

9.2

90.8

1985

6.2

93.8

1988

5.5

94.5

Sources:

MOF;
Taiwan Statistical Data Book.
Table 9b
Composition of Exports in Korea

Year

Agricultural and Processed
Agricultural Products

Industrial Products

1959

87.5

12.5

1960

85.8

14.2

1965

38.9

61.1

1970

22.6

77.4

1975

18.3

81. 7

1980

9.5

95.5

1985

8.2

91.8

1988

6.2

93.8

Sources:

MOF;
Office of Customs Administration;
The Bank of Korea -- Economic statistics Yearbook,
Various Years
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Taiwan's industria l sector labor absorptio n, which had been
at a 3% annual level in the 50s, approxima tely doubled to more
than 6% in the 60s.

It should be noted, however, that much of

this so-called "migration " consisted of people not actually
leaving the rural household , but continuing to work in
surroundin g areas or even by commuting to export-pr ocessing
zones.

Only 17% of the so-called ''migrants" actually left the

rural areas in 1963 and, even as late as 1968, only 26% of newly
absorbed industria l workers had actually physicall y migrated.
This feature once again underline s the continued remarkabl e
expansion , not only absolutely but even relatively , of rural
industry and services.

As Table 10 shows, the percentag e

distributi on of employed persons by locality actually shifted in
favor of the rural areas in both manufactu ring and services
between 1956 and 1966, a quite remarkabl e phenomeno n.
This booming non-agric ultural activity, still heavily rural
but increasing ly export-or iented, was facilitate d by such policy
inducemen ts as the streamlin ing of previously establishe d tariff
rebates for exports (in lieu of fuller import liberaliza tion) as
well as the construct ion of several export processin g zones in
the mid-60s, supplemen ted by bonded factories , away from the port
cities, increasing ly dotting the landscape .

If one accepts the

recent Lucas theoretic al comment on Taiwan's success 2 , this
rapid change in East Asian exports and export compositio n would
seem to be one way in which an accelerate d learning-b y-doing
process on the human capital side took place.
2

Making a Miracle, August, 1992, processed .
27

Table 10
Distribution of Employed Persons by Locality(%):
Taiwan
1956
Cities

Towns

1966
Rural

Cities

Towns

Rural

Manufacturing
Food
Textile and Apparel
Production of wood,
stalk, bamboo
Furniture and fixtures
Chemicals
Nonmetallic products
Metal products
Machinery & equipment
Transport equipment
Others

42.68
24.11
34.10
31.29

10.06
8.51
14.40
8.16

47.26
67.38
51.50
60.55

37.02
23.50
27.87
40.06

10.80
9.83
13.65
6.63

52.18
66.67
58.48
53.31

32.00
57.53
31.84
52.32
62.60
60.32
57.10

9. 71
9.86
6.70
12.58
8.66
5.82
9.27

58.29
32.79
61.46
35.10
28.74
33.86
33.63

32.07
42.48
25.85
49.90
54.94
48.58
42.90

9.28
10.92
6.12
12.37
6.10
7.55
12.50

58.65
46.60
68.03
37.73
38.96
43.87
44.60

Construction

44.84

11.45

43. 71

43.92

12.27

43.81

Utilities

51. 30

9.74

38.96

47.25

9.89

42.86

Commerce
Trade
Bank, insurance, etc.

44.36
42. 77
65.47

9.98
9.92
10.79

45.66
47.30
23.74

42.34
38.78
65.12

10.56
10.83
8.83

47.10
50.39
26.05

Transport & communication

54.27

8.92

36.81

50.74

9.50

39.76

Services
Public service*
Education
Personal service
Others

41.16
50.27
36.81
34.06
39.85

9.73
10.45
8.79
9.76
8.89

49.11
39.28
54.40
56.18
51. 26

34.44
32.63
36.53
33.14
43.48

9.38
9.97
9.50
7.88
8.86

56.17
57.41
53.98
58.98
47.67

* In 1956, excludes military personnel living on military bases.

Source:

Table 4 in Samuel P.S. Ho, "The Rural Non-Farm Sector
in Taiwan," World Bank Studies in Employment and Rural
Development, no. 32 (Washington, D.C., September 1976).
Underlying data from the 1956 and 1966 population
censuses. Cities includes the seven largest Cities;
Towns, the nine largest towns; Rural, the rest.

What rendered rapid growth consistent with the continued
equitable distribution of income during the 60s were two major
factors already at play in the 50s and continuing to assume an
important role.

One was that the poorest, i.e. the smallest,
28

farmers continued to participate more than proportionally in the
economy's booming rural industrial and service activities.
Second was that these rural industries and services were
extremely labor-intensive and increasingly so, especially in the
mid-60s when food processing played a prominent role.

As a

consequence, the Kuznets-Arthur Lewis prediction that during a
period of labor surplus the profit share would have to rise and
the labor share fall, and that the size distribution of income
would therefore worsen, was not borne out.

Employment increases

made up for the continued low level of unskilled industrial wages
and permitted the Gini Coefficient to remain in the .29 range
throughout this period of very rapid growth.

Counter to the

usual assumptions, the shift that took place was not from an
egalitarian agricultural sector to a non-egalitarian non
agricultural sector, but from an increasingly egalitarian
agricultural sector to an even more egalitarian non-agricultural
sector.
The situation in Korea was not quite as favorable, because,
as has already been pointed out, its non-agricultural sector was
more urban-oriented, large-scale, capital-intensive, and
increasingly so at the margin; the fact that its agricultural
sector was not able to contribute as much and foreign capital
consequently had to be more heavily relied on was not irrelevant
to the outcome.

Thus, while Korea still figures prominently as

one of the relative success cases in terms of development
performance, including income distribution, its Gini levels were
substantially higher, in the .35 range, during the 60s and early
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70s, and did not improve over the period.
Savings rates in both East Asian countries rose
substantially during the 60s (see above, Table 4), with the
contribution of the private sector predominant, especially via
household savings and the reinvestment by the medium and small
scale entrepreneur s of Taiwan.

One of the reasons for the

somewhat lower domestic savings rate and the greater reliance on
foreign savings in Korea is that, having been less successful in
mobilizing agriculture, she early on had to resort to food
imports.

However, the fact that the government, including its

public enterprises, contributed substantially to overall national
savings in both countries is itself quite remarkable in the light
of general LDC experience.
Let me now turn from the above description of the actual
performance of the East Asian case during this phase of the
transition to the role of government policy in various
dimensions.

The important contribution of the JCRR at the

center, working with various types of decentralize d farmers'
associations and providing major institutiona l support for
agricultural productivity increase, as well as related rural non
agricultural activities, has already been referred to.

As a

semi-public, semi-autonom ous agency of government, the JCRR was
isolated from daily political pressures, able to respond to local
needs in research, extension, credit and marketing, at
provincial, county and township levels.

Experiment stations

funded by the JCRR continued to work on new seeds and non
traditional crops, encouraging changes in the agricultural output
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mix.

The JCRR-farmers' association network simultaneously served

.the needs of agricultural extension, provided purchasing,
marketing, warehousing and processing information and facilities,
as well as, importantly, cooperative banking.

This last feature

is especially interesting because through it substantial rural
private savings were channeled from agricultural into non
agricultural activities, with farmers depositing their own
surpluses locally, rather than waiting for subsidized credit
lines from above, the typical procedure in most developing
countries.

Both production and longer-term loans were made

without reference to collateral but on a cooperatively
guaranteed, Grameen Bank-like basis.

Other banks were also able

to channel their loans through the cooperative bank wings of
farmers' associations.
The Taiwan Government continued to build on the initial
conditions already referred to via power, transport,
communications, rail- and highway construction throughout the
island.

Such infrastructure was not directed to the support of

particular regions or industries, but there seems to have been a
conscious effort to continue to be even-handed, by permitting a
decentralized government structure, working largely through the
farmers' associations, to pinpoint priorities for the allocation
of resources.

Rural and urban elecricity rates continued to be

maintained at parity, so that the power system, while not
subsidized overall, engaged in inter-sectoral cross
subsidization.

It should, moreover, be noted that, in 1960, the

government initiated the setting up of industrial districts,
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providing infrastructu re and overhead facilities to encourage
decentralize d industrial activities.

By 1986, there were 88 such

industrial districts in operation.
We have already referred to the import duty rebate for
exports, started in the 50s, and the export processing zones,
begun in the mid-60s, as helpful transition devices for economies
moving from a domestic to an external orientation.

Such devices

proved especially helpful in the electronics and other light
assembly industries which were part of the rapid output and
employment generation spurt of the 1960s.

The zones provided no

more than 1% of total employment and 3% of investment, but 6% of
exports over the years.

More importantly, they permitted

entrepreneur s to put their feet into competitive waters while the
domestic economy continued substantially protected.

Gradually,

as competence grew, additional forward or finishing stages could
be and were added, intermediate inputs procured and sales made
into the domestic economy, with the necessary adjustments made in
terms of the customary tariff waivers etc.

Finally, once labor

surplus had come to an end in the late 60s and early 70s, the
zones' historical mission had been completed and they began to
atrophy, with firms gradually moving out.

Thus, in a number of

ways beyond the accommodatin g shift in macro-polici es, the
government provided specific direct institutiona l support
permitting Taiwan to explore rural niche markets at home and
growing competitive markets abroad.
Let me turn now to the human capital, technology, as well as
the labor market dimensions of the story, areas in which both
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additiona l governmen t feasance and non-feasa nce made signal
contribut ions.

As was already pointed out, Taiwan's unusually

decentral ized industria lization effort was initially assisted by
the presence of a substanti al number of small traders and
supported by the continued emphasis on compulsor y primary
education .

As the economy moved through the 60s and the

industria l output mix change accelerate d, the state's education al
emphasis also shifted.
Overall, expenditu res on education in Taiwan rose from 2.1%
of GNP (11% of the budget) in 1955 to 4.6% (20% of the budget) in
1970.

In Korea they rose from 1.7% of GNP in 1965 to 3.5% in

1970.

Moreover, it is interestin g to note that the East Asian

countries not only spent an increasing percentag e of their GNP
but also allocated a much higher proportio n to recurring rather
than non-recur ring expenditu res than is customary in the typical
developin g country context (see Figure 8}.

This is illuminati ng,

indicating how much of the effort was directed at the quality of
what is going on within the schools, rather than on the size of
the education al plant and the expansion of physical facilities .
From the very beginning , these governmen ts seem to have
understoo d the importanc e of human capital in support of the
economy.

But what is even more interestin g is their flexibilit y

in shifting the emphasis of the education al structure over time
as the demands of the economy changed.
At the outset, literacy and general numeracy objective s seem
to have been uppermost .

In Taiwan, the six years of compulsor y

primary education were extended to 9 years in 1968, just when the
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Figure 8a
Taiwan Education Expenditure
(Percentage of GNP)
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1990 Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China: Director-General of
Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, Republic of China.
Figure 8b
Korea Education Expenditure
(Percentage of GNP)
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first signs of unskilled labor scarcity, indexed by the rise in
unskilled real wages, began to appear.

We may also note a sharp

increase in female participation rates after 1967.

This turning

point coincided as well with a much increased emphasis given to
vocational relative to academic training at the secondary level.
Such training increased six-fold between 1966 and 1974, during a
time when the non-agricultural labor force increased by 80%.
While 40% of Taiwan's high-school students were in the vocational
track in 1963, by 1972 the percentage was 52% and by 1980 almost
two-thirds (see Figure 5).

It is interesting to note that this

pattern is much less pronounced in Korea, both in terms of level
and trend over time.
Vocational education in Taiwan was administered
approximately half by private enterprises and half by government
agencies. 3

The government influenced the number and growth of

academic relative to vocational and technical high schools by
using differential tuition as a carrot.

In the vocational

schools, agriculture, commerce and the industrial arts were
combined.

It should be emphasized that the vocational education

structure was highly diversified, kept flexible and responsive to
changing demands.
At the outset, Taiwan and Korea clearly could call on an
efficient but cheap unskilled labor force, an extremely important
ingredient in any competitive, export-oriented development
3

Forty-two government agencies and eighty public
enterprises providing vocational education, 133 private
enterprises providing in-house training, 78 universities as well
as 229 private organizations offering relatively short (4-12
weeks) courses.
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Figure Sa
Taiwan Vocational Students as a
Percentage of High School Enrollment
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Taiwan Statistical Data Book: Council for Economic Planning and
Development; Republic of China, 1990.
Figure Sb
Korean Vocational Students as a
Percentage of High School Enrollment
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process.

Taiwan's primary enrollment rates for the ages 16-24

rose from 40% in

1

53/'54 to 60% by the early 70s, even faster for

women than for men, the average number of years of schooling for
those over 15 rising from 2.8 to 6.9.

Very similar figures could

be cited for Korea.
Education as a public sector responsibility represents a
very strong cultural tradition in East Asia.

Even as private

sector schooling above the primary level, i.e. high school and
above, increased in relative quantitative importance (from 10% in
1950 to 60% in 1980), the best students continued to be trained
in the public institutions where the quality was clearly higher.
Expenditures per student are 2.5 times those of private schools
and the teacher-student ratio at the national university level is
12:1 compared to 29:1 in private universities.

students pay only

50% of the costs even in private schools, the government picking
up the rest, while they pay only 7% of total costs in public high
schools and universities.

Throughout the public system,

competitive examinations, rather than the ability to pay or
family connection, determine entry, part of the cultural heritage
derived from the Imperial Examinations System of traditional
China.
As far as the labor market is concerned, as indicated above,
agricultural wages continued to lag considerably behind
agricultural productivity increase, thus setting the base line
for unskilled labor remuneration in the system, as long as the
labor surplus persisted.

Unskilled non-agricultural wages

continued at a reasonably small margin above agricultural wages
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(see Figure 3), while the relative price of unskilled workers
rose with the end of labor surplus and squeezed the
skilled/unsk illed wage gap, which had never been high (see Figure
4).

The latter differential on Taiwan was about 20% in 1953,

perhaps 30% in the mid-60s, and once again 20% in 1970, extremely
low by internationa l LDC standards.
The usual intervention s in non-agricult ural labor markets,
i.e. minimum wage legislation and labor unions, accounted for
very little in both Taiwan and Korea until very recently.

There

were as many as 2000 labor unions in Taiwan, covering about 20%
of the non-agricult ural labor force.

But unions have

concentrated heavily on working conditions, not collective
bargaining, with strikes either illegal or frowned upon and work
stoppages still rather rare.

The small impact of unionization on

labor market conditions -- at least until very recently -- is
demonstrated by the fact that the percentage of the non
agricultural labor force unionized in Taiwan was consistently
larger than that in Korea (see Figure 6), even though unions have
to date played a substantially larger political role in Korea.
Minimum wage legislation in Taiwan has been on the books since
1956, but these wages have been consistently below actual wages,
usually at 40-60% of the average manufacturin g wage, and have not
been relevant, even for unskilled labor, at any time in East
Asia's development history.

In both Korea and Taiwan, wages

across different skill levels seem to converge more as a result
of supply-side changes brought about by education and increased
access, thus reducing educational inequality, rather than as a
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Figure 6a
Taiwan Non-Agricultural Unionism
(% of labor force)
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consequence of changes in the industrial structure on the demand
side.
The overall economic record is thus quite clear: it was
during this decade that rapid growth, heavily supported initially
by agriculture, then gradually shifting towards labor-intensive
industrial exports, resulted in rapid employment generation and
continued favorable income distribution results.

Savings and

growth rates soared in both countries and total factor
productivity increased in importance as both economies, but
especially Taiwan, became ever more competitive.
This second phase can be characterized by a huge explosion
in the importance of exports, a dramatic shift in export
composition, as well as the very rapid absorption of the labor
force in non-agricultural activities, with a surprisingly large
proportion located in the rural sector.

output mix and

technologies continued to favor the absorption of a relatively
unskilled, if highly literate and therefore high-quality, labor
force.

Ultimately, by the early 70s, Taiwan had exhausted her

unskilled labor surplus, as is demonstrated by the fact that
unskilled real wages, which had been rising gently up to that
point, began to rise sharply.

Given the continued flexibly

competitive labor markets, maximum labor absorption took place.
Increased participation rates plus offshore (South-East Asian)
sourcing and some (largely illegal) immigration of South-East
Asian workers could not postpone the advent of labor shortage.
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IV.

The Technology Era -- The Mid-70s, sos, and Beyond.
At least three outstanding phenomena should be emphasized

regarding this latest phase of East Asian development -- one
through which these systems are currently still trying to find
their way to full mature economy status.

First is the fact that

agriculture, having performed its historical mission, if less
well and more belatedly in Korea, has gradually petered out as a
catalyst and source of saving and has become a subsidized
appendage to the economy.

Second, given the newly arrived and

increasingly felt shortage of labor, the shift in industrial
output and export mixes has accelerated dramatically .
Electronics, information, science and technology-i ntensive
exports soared from $3.1 billion in 1981 to $12.5 billion in
1989, and now substantially exceed those of textiles, garments
and other light industry.

The continuing drastic change in the

overall structure of exports was already indicated in Table 9.
Third, vastly increased attention is now being paid to science
and technology-r elated infrastructu re and institutiona l changes
encouraging additional R&D activity in both the public and
private sectors.
With respect to the role of agriculture, as we saw clearly
from Table 2, East Asia's underlying long-run natural resources
poverty has gradually asserted itself.

The New Community

Movement in Korea gave something of a belated spurt to that
sector, but in both cases agricultural goods are increasingly
being imported rather than exported, and farmers subsidized
rather than taxed -- the latter a less than rational response.
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Thus, while 15-20% of Taiwan's agricultural output had been
transferred into non-agricultural investment in the form of
agricultural surpluses during the 50s and 60s, the direction of
resource flow was reversed after 1973.

A push for a second land

reform, involving land consolidation, the acceleration of
mechanization and the advent of specialized cultivating firms
permitting the subcontracting of certain processes, all
represented predictable, rational policy responses to the
changing role of that sector.

Unfortunately the enhanced

protection and subsidization of farmers represents an equally
predictable but less rational response for society en route to
economic maturity.
The reader should be reminded that East Asia, especially
Taiwan, is still trying to prolong the life of its labor
intensive activities by investing in such low wage overseas areas
as Mainland China, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, also
by closing its official eye to a limited volume of unskilled,
largely illegal, immigrants from these areas.

Her still

absolutely substantial labor-intensive exports will continue to
flow predominantly to the advanced countries; the rapidly
expanding higher-tech and more capital intensive exports, on the
other hand, as international trade theory tells us, will see a
larger proportion destined for ''neighboring" developing
countries.

Government attention has shifted increasingly in this

high-tech, high level manpower direction, both of the home-grown
and imported variety, especially at the post-graduate level.

It

should, moreover, be noted that, with the change in output mix,
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there is now some tendency to shift towards the larger scale and
greater industrial concentration .

Especially in light of the

still relatively underdevelop ed domestic financial markets, there
is even greater reference, e.g. in the current Six Year Plan, to
the need for government enterprises to play a role in directly
productive activities where economies of scale are pronounced.
With respect to human capital, as non-agricult ural output
mixes and technologies moved persistently in a more skill
intensive direction, the educational strategy continued to be
flexible, reflecting the changing needs of the system.

By 1988,

total expenditures on education had risen to a new high of 5.2%
of GNP on Taiwan; moreover, while, in the sos, 50% of the total
had been spent on primary education, 35% on secondary, and 15% on
higher, we now see 30% spent on primary, 40% on secondary, and
30% on higher education.

As significant is the fact that by

1989, fully 70% of high schools were vocationally oriented on
Taiwan, representing the acceleration of an already referred to
earlier trend.

With the agricultural population now declining

absolutely and at a rapid pace, it is interesting to note that of
those who stayed behind, 84% had only primary school education or
less, while of those who left 52% were in that category. 4
In both countries higher education, moreover, has continued
to shift towards engineering and the natural sciences, and away
from the traditional humanities and agricultural concentratio ns.
Government intervention at the university level was effected by
way of quotas, but partly also in the form of financial carrots,
4

Computed from 1975 Agricultural Census.
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in the case of Taiwan, with new departmen ts in industria l
engineerin g, industria l design, automatic controls, petro
chemistry etc., establishe d.

As Figure 7 indicates , the trend

seems to have been more pronounce d in the case of Taiwan.

But

everywher e in East Asia it was increasing ly being recognize d that
more engineerin g and sciences oriented programs were required for
developin g follower countries which are no longer in a position
to depend for their productiv ity increases either on the shift
from agricultu re to non-agric ulture or on the adaptatio n of the
relatively simple technolog ies and designs associate d with labor
intensive industria l expansion . 5

It now became necessary to

make more careful technolog y and output mix choices and to devise
the appropria te adaptive, and at the end possibly even
Schumpete rian type innovativ e responses .

This meant a concerted

shift in attitudes toward high-tech manpower as well as R&D and
intellectu al property matters generally .
An early harbinger of this awareness of changing needs was a
scramble to set up R&D-orien ted cabinet committee s (1965),
establish a National Science Council (1967), and create such R&D
oriented institutes as the Chung Shan Institute of Science and
Technolog y (1965) and ITRI, the Institute of Industria l Training
and Research (1973).
It is also noteworth y that while, between 1960 and 1967,
approxima tely one-sixth of all of Taiwan's college graduates had
gone to the United States for further post-grad uate study,

5

Technolog y changes frequently suggested by foreign
importers (see the work of Larry Westphal et al. on Korea etc.)
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Figure 7a
Taiwan Higher Education Participation
Engineering + Natural Science % of Total
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Figure 7b
Korea Higher Education Participation
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two-third s in science and engineerin g, only 4.5% annually had
returned.

After 1973 a major governmen t effort was started to

encourage a reverse flow of this high-tale nt manpower by active
recruitme nt in such locations as the Silicon Valley and the offer
of substanti al financial incentive s.

The effort to tap this

overseas reservoir of human flight capital was coordinate d by the
National Youth Commissio n and the National Science Council.

As a

consequen ce of these efforts, while only a handful of highly
trained graduates returned before 1970, by 1986 more than 90% did
so.

It is estimated that in recent years almost 10,000 Taiwanese

graduates of U.S. universit ies have returned home to take up
positions , mainly in Taiwan's science and technolog y related
industria l activitie s.

Many have become venture capitalis ts in

their own right.
The establishm ent of additiona l governmen t machinery and
infrastruc ture, focused on the science and technolog y end of the
spectrum, was initially heavily focussed on this effort to
reverse the earlier brain drain.

The creation in 1982 of the

Employmen t and Vocationa l Training Administr ation signalled the
governme nt's concern with the maintenan ce of continued
flexibilit y and the needed enhanced responsiv eness of domestic
education al efforts to the quickly changing needs of the economy.
The China Productiv ity Center was set up, also in the early 80s,
to focus on the managemen t skills needed at the middle and top
levels, though less exclusive ly directed at the science and
technolog y end of the spectrum.

A National Science Council

committee to worry about R&D needs at the applied end, and the
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Chung Shan Institute of Science and Technology at the other had
been established as early as the late 60s.

The Industrial

Training and Research Institute (ITRI) was set up in 1973, and
the Institute for Information Industry, along with the Shin Chu
Science-Based Industrial Park, in 1979.

Most prominent of these

has been the last mentioned, encouraging new ventures in high
tech areas via the provision of public facilities to private
firms on favorable terms 6 and the guarantee of close physical
and intellectual contacts with academic and private commercial
interests.

Fully 70% of the companies in this park have been

under the direction of returned overseas Chinese in recent years.
ITRI, located nearby, carries on basic industrial research
in areas which might be under-represented due to the continued
predominance of small and medium scale firms in Taiwan.

The

Institute has a $400 million annual budget and performs a
substantial amount of in-house product and process innovation,
much of it by attempting to adapt foreign technology through
reverse engineering, devising its own patents and/or issuing
licenses as appropriate.

It also "sells" technical assistance

and market information to medium and small-scale firms, and thus
does not depend exclusively on government subsidy, although it is
still heavily focused on government research projects, with
private contracts growing only gradually.
Overall, in Taiwan, 60% of R&D is carried out within private

6

5-year tax exemptions, a ceiling on taxes at 22%
thereafter, subsidized rent and credit facilities, as well as
other amenities.
47

industry and 40% within various public sector institutes, with
the government funding 60% and the private sector 40% of the
total.

In other words, private sector R&D is generally carried

out in-house by large firms, while the government has supported
and/or carried out R&D and training-related activities of benefit
to the large population of medium and small scale firms.
Parenthetically, a recent visit to ITRI convinced this
observer that a major explicit contribution of the Institute, in
addition to providing information and venture capital to medium
and small scale entrepreneurs, has been via the actual creation
of a new body of technologically oriented venture capitalists,
staff members who, given ITRI's remarkably high turnover rate,
found their way continuously into the private sector.
During the decade of the sos, both Korea and Taiwan
increased their R&D from approximately 1% to 2.5% of GNP, a
substantial expansion symptomatic of the new phase of growth they
had entered, if still substantially less than what the industrial
economies allocate.

But these figures, it should be understood,

do not capture the more informal "blue collar" type of R&D which
takes place in the machine-shops and on the factory floors of
many S&M establishments.

The national "white collar" figures,

adding up officially reported R&D activities in the large firms
and public sector, thus tend to substantially underestimate the
total tinkering and adaptation which is going on, especially in
the Taiwan case with its unusually large and relatively growing
population of S&M firms.

It should also be no surprise that,

given the relatively minor role of public sector enterprises in
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Korea and their pronounced decline in Taiwan over time, private
sector R&D has assumed increasing importance.

Moreover, foreign

private R&D, never a dominant feature of the landscape in Taiwan,
has virtually disappeared there, but retains a substantial role
in Korea.
By 1982, admittedly under pressure from the U.S. and Europe,
amendments to the trademark and patent laws were introduced to
strengthen East Asia's intellectual property rights, and
simultaneous ly additional fiscal incentives were provided for the
current costing R&D.

In 1983, an integrated program

simultaneous ly strengthenin g science and technology-o riented
training at home while recruiting abroad the high-level manpower
needed immediately was formulated; and in 1986 a full-fledged 10year science and technology development plan incorporating all
aspects of the stretegy was approved.

Unlike in other LDC

contexts, in East Asia such general formulations tend to move
beyond general exhortation and incorporate specific policy and
institutiona l initiatives.

Clearly, along with the move in

recent years to more public sector and economies of scale-related
projects, as in the recently inaugurated Six Year Plan, there has
been active government intervention in accelerating both research
and the acquisition of human capital in the science, engineering
and high-tech areas.
It should also be noted that the character of R&D itself has
undergone considerable change.

Basic research is still carried

on largely by the government and applied research by the private
sector; but product development, which comprised only 40% of R&D
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in 1970, constituted 66% by 1979, with government still focussing
more on capital goods and process change, leaving product
development more and more to the private sector.
Patents as an (admittedly imperfect) indicator of innovative
activity of course also increased, from 2,770 in 1980 to 7,500 in
1989, a 300% rise.

Similarly, we have witnessed an almost

tenfold increase in paper citations during the decade, a measure
of the increased productivity of basic research in the public
sector sponsored research institutes and universities .
It is, of course, always difficult to assess the impact of
this combination of human capital accumulation and R&D activity
on bottom line performance.

In the mixed economy much clearly

depends on the competitiven ess of the private sector, which is
being fortified and fertilized by the addition of these public
goods.

Where -- given too much rent-seeking and monopoly power -

- there exists little active demand for putting these goods to
work in the form of product and/or process innovations, the
results are bound to be discouraging .

Where a measure of

workably competitive conditions exists -- certainly true for
Taiwan but perhaps less so for the chaebol-domi nated industries
of Korea -- the externalitie s provided by government should have
a substantial pay-off.

One of the ways of assessing this issue -

- though admittedly beset by several problems of both theory and
measurement -- is to obtain comparable estimates of the
contribution of total factor productivity to growth.
As Table 11 demonstrates , and as our priors might have led
us to expect, the aforemention ed favorable combination yielded
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substantially higher levels of total factor productivity in
Taiwan than in Korea, though we only have one data set for Korea
showing an extremely wide range.

It is necessary, however, to

recall that both systems performed substantially better in this
respect than, say, Latin America, where most countries have
experienced negligible or even negative rates of total factor
productivity growth.
As a consequence there is little doubt in my mind that East
Asia has the necessary entrepreneurial and policy flexibility to
weather inevitable future exogenous shocks and "stay the course."
It is likely to be able to continue to avoid the retreat to stop
go restrictionist regimes and/or to policy mixes which fail to
recognize the ever more critical importance of relying on the
human capital dimension if the systems are to meet the
accelerating challenges of globalization and convergence.
Table 11
Percentaae Contribution to Growth of Total
Factor Productivity in Manufacturing
Taiwan:

source:

1952-1961

56%

1961-1976

36%

1976-1987

47%

1961-1987

40%

H. Pack, "New Perspectives on Industrial Growth in
Taiwan" in G. Ranis, editor, Taiwan: From Developing to
Mature Economy, Westview Press, 1992.
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Korea:
1960-1973
Source:

V.

4% - 44% (range)

ij

Kwang Suk Kim and Michael Roemer, "Growth and
Structural Transformatio n" in Studies in the
Modernizatio n of the Republic of Korea: 1945-1975
(Council on East Asian studies, Harvard Univ.), 1979.

Some Conclusions.
The fact that the East Asian economies are relatively small,

natural resource poor and human resources rich, and that they
were endowed at the outset with relatively good physical and
institutiona l infrastructu re, is as important as the fact that
their newly independent governments continued to build on that
base.

Like other developing countries, they moved into an early

import substitution sub-phase, one which was, however, relatively
short and relatively mild.
If there was one key to the Ea~t Asian success, especially
Taiwan's, it was, in my view, the early attention paid to the
agricultural sector, working in tandem with decentralized non
agricultural growth.

On the human capital front, the East Asians

initially emphasized literacy and numeracy by concentrating on
primary education, then moved flexibly to emphasizing vocational
and, still later, graduate science and technology-o riented
education -- all as required by the system's continuously
changing economic structure.

Labor markets were permitted to

behave competitivel y, i.e. there was very little intervention
either through government support of unions, or through minimum
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wage legislatio n which had any "bite."

Public policy was instead

clearly focused on easing the transition from inward to outward
oriented developme nt.

This meant providing the necessary

infrastruc ture and externali ties to ensure vigorous balanced
growth domestica lly and complemen tary export oriented activitie s,
concentra ting first on labor-inte nsive and later on continuou sly
changing high-tech , capital and skill-inte nsive output mixes.
In summary, policy changes seem to have consisten tly
accommoda ted the changing needs of the economy, rather than
directing its path.

During the most rapid growth period, the

60s, high growth, equitable distributi on and full employmen t were
all achieved by way of the open economy export-or iented strategy.
Moreover, such success did not lead to growth activism on the
part of the governmen t.

Fiscal and monetary policy remained

restrained and flexible, relying largely on overt rather than
covert means of transferr ing resources among interest groups.
Trade liberaliza tion proceeded slowly but steadily, exchange
rates were maintaine d at more or less realistic levels
throughou t, and internatio nal capital market liberaliza tion kept
to the last.
Such prudence and flexibilit y on the part of policy makers
became even more evident when put to the stronger test during
times of internatio nal adversity .

Unlike many other developin g

countries , Taiwan accepted somewhat lower growth rates in the
face of negative external shocks, but maintaine d the direction of
reforms without major zigs or zags in various policy arenas.
Korea's long-run pattern is broadly similar, but there are also
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important differences.

For one, Korea paid relatively less

attention to the agricultural sector and rural industry early on
and was more tempted by the notion that large-scale urban
oriented activities could pull the economy along.

High growth

rates were achieved by the successful shift to external
orientation; however, the financing of that growth was not
supported by agriculture and therefore required a larger volume
of foreign capital, leading to debt problems and a more capital
intensive industrialization path.
While the emphasis on vocational education was somewhat less
pronounced in Korea, there is underlying similarity in both the
human capital and labor market dimensions.

One thing that might

be noted is that while the policy trend was generally linear in
Korea as well, it was less consistently so than in Taiwan, partly
as a consequence of greater political instability, partly because
of the larger exposure to international shocks.

There were

indeed times when Korea's behavior temporarily resembled that of
the more typical LDC, characterized by growth activism, resort to
large-scale borrowing, high levels of inflation, including at
times a somewhat more active union movement. However, in contrast
to most developing country experience, these deviations were
temporary, with the system showing a capacity to return to a
steady liberalization trend.

Consequently, the long-run

performance of Korea has undoubtedly been highly successful by
any international standard -- even if the results, in terms of
income distribution, for example, have not been as good as for
Taiwan.

What marks off Korea from the more typical LDC case is
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the remarkable ability of the authorities to recognize mistakes
and to quickly take appropriate corrective action.
The East Asian experience indicates that the gradual
sequencing of policy change can work and the system can put up
with the maintenance of some discretionar y controls for some
time, and still be quite successful in the total transition
effort.

For example, in Taiwan, while it is important to

remember that tariffication and harmonizatio n took place early,
only relatively small steps towards tariff reduction and full
import liberalizatio n were taken in the 60s and 70s.

Not until

1983 was the principle of the survival of the fittest through the
discipline of internationa l import competition fully accepted.
Thus a pragmatic effort at policy change which is maintained more
or less consistently has been demonstrated to be much superior to
the more frequently encountered fluctuation pattern, alternating
between periods of relatively doctrinaire interventioni sm and
equally doctrinaire free-market episodes.

Parenthetica lly, the

experience with sustained gradualism in East Asian policy reforms
and the complementar y direct actions of government is also, I
believe, relevant to the current debate over the relevant
advantages of gradual vs. cold-turkey reforms in the East
European context.
Taiwan's public policies can be said to have worked
consistently through, rather than attempting to replace markets.
Unlike Korea, Taiwan has never engaged in anything remotely
resembling central planning, witness the relative weakness of the
CEPD and its predecessor agencies relative to Korea's Economic
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Planning Bureau, a super ministry headed by the Deputy Prime
Minister.

Looking backward, one can say that Taiwan's policy

makers have understood from the beginning that the ever
increasing complexity of development requires an ever-increasing
reliance on indirect controls and across-the-board policies
rather than highly selective direct interventions by government.
The East Asian experience certainly confirms the necessity
of government intervention in both agricultural research and S&M
development, where the appropriability of the returns from
science and technology is usually restricted by the inherent
competitiveness of the activity.

Second, there were critical

government interventions in fashioning the appropriate
organizational and institutional structure, reducing transactions
costs, and in providing infrastructural facilities and policies
to ease the gradual transition from inward to outward
orientation.

Third, the need to create temporary innovation

profits in private hands in the large-scale non-agricultural
sector through R&D and the strengthening of patents and other
intellectual property rights was increasingly recognized.
The same can be said for the continuing redirection of
educational investments, as well as the government's science and
technology structure poised to be flexibly supportive of the
changing demands of the market.

Third world public sector

scientific institutes often lay claim to a substantial volume of
human and fiscal resources.

Mobilizing these resources on behalf

of private sector innovative activity, especially in the current
science and technology-oriente d era, represents an important
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institutional contribution to successful development in the East
Asian case.

What is, I believe, particularly instructive, is

that, in spite of the one-party, apparently highly centralized
public sectors of East Asia, there actually was, particularly in
Taiwan, a good deal of decentralization of decision-making at
work, public and private, yielding both growth and equity.
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